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from 2006 to 2012, we assess the effect of financial development and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) on the allocation of China’s industrial investment, 
based on two investment allocation efficiency indicators, the industrial 
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allocation efficiency was spurred by domestic bank loan whose impact was 
largely reduced by FDI, and loan to the private sector had a mild influence 
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using industrial value added elasticity of total fixed assets as the indicator 
of the investment allocation efficiency, which could be attributed to the 
fact that China's FDI was below the minimum threshold value to fully 
promote the optimization of domestic bank loan but reached that for loans 
to the private sector. Furthermore, stock market has a positive effect on 
investment allocation efficiency and barely any crowding out effect on FDI. 
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1. Introduction
 China experienced amazing high growth rate of GDP in the past 
decade, most of which was contributed to the increased investment in the 
fixed asset. For example, in 2013, the proportion of total investment in 
fixed assets in GDP was 78.46 %, and the total fixed assets investment 
grew by 19.1%. In 2014, the final consumption expenditure accounted for 
only 37.3% of the GDP in China, while this ratio was 68.5% in the USA 
and was above 75% in other developed countries such as Britain, Germany, 
and Japan. In other words, there exists an issue of excessively high 
investment rate in China's GDP structure. The economy needs to maintain 
a certain growth rate of investment, which is the driving force of economic 
development, but over-investment and excessive investment growth may 
induce pivotal problems related to credit expansion, land finance, excess 
capacity and so on, and lead to the imbalance of economic structure and 
atrophy of the residents' consumption.
Investment-led GDP has become a practical circumstance in China, 
which is difficult to be reversed in the short term. Hence, the government 
should improve the efficiency of investment when restructuring the 
economy gradually, because high investment allocation efficiency could 
effectively promote the development of economy. When considering the 
investment allocation efficiency, a prevailing assumption is that "the 
best form of investment is to increase investment in growing industries 
and reduce investment in declining industries". That is, if investment 
flows to the industries with high expected return and withdraws from the 
industries with low expected return, the investment is efficient. Based 
on this assumption, many scholars study the domestic or transnational 
economic investment allocation efficiency, and analyze the related factors 
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that influence the investment allocation efficiency.
When it comes to investment allocation efficiency, we should clarify the 
sources of investment first. In general, there are five main capital sources 
for fixed assets investment, i.e., stafe budget, domestic loans, foreign 
investment utilization, self-raising funds and other investment. From the 
statistical yearbook, we can find that domestic loans compose a relatively 
large part in the industrial investment. In 2012, China's non-financial 
corporate loans increased by 5.66 trillion yuan, while the annual industrial 
investment was 15.5 trillion yuan, and the bank loan accounted for 36.5 
% of the industrial investment. On the other hand, the amount of foreign 
investment utilization was 111.7 billion dollars, accounting for about 4.7% 
of the industrial investment after conversion. As shown in the statistics, 
bank credit and foreign investment are the two main sources of funds 
for the investment in industry in China. In addition, compared with self-
raising funds, bank credit and foreign investment have great advantages in 
the sense that they have a clear demand of investment return, which would 
bring pressure on enterprises and promote the enterprises to improve 
operation.
One of the most curtail functions of the financial system is to allocate 
capital efficiently, i.e., to increase investment in the regions or industries 
with high returns and to reduce investment in area or industries with 
poor prospects. Financial development contributes to economic growth 
through a considerable amount of channels such as helping a country take 
better advantage of its investment opportunities (Wurgler, 2000). The 
difference in development of financial sector is able to explain a substantial 
proportion (although not all) of the cross-country variation in the quality of 
capital allocation. Calderon and Liu (2003) find that financial development 
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generally leads to economic growth and financial deepening propels 
economic growth through both a more rapid capital accumulation and 
productivity growth, with the latter channel being the strongest. However, 
Rioja and et al. (2004) find that financial development has an uncertain 
effect on growth in countries with very low levels of financial development 
and a large, positive effect on growth in countries with intermediate levels 
of financial development and a positive, but smaller effect in countries with 
high levels of financial development, respectively. Christopoulos et al. (2004) 
investigate the long-run relationship between financial depth and economic 
growth, they claim that financial depth is an important factor in promoting 
economic growth, but economic growth does not necessarily promote 
financial depth. Ndikumana (2005) finds that financial intermediation 
affects domestic investment notably by alleviating financing constraints, 
allowing firms to increase investment in response to increased demand for 
output. Galindo et al. (2007) find that liberalization increases the efficiency 
with which investment funds are allocated. Islam et al. (2006) examine the 
impact of financial market development on the extent to which firms rely 
on internal capital for making investments and find evidence of a negative 
relationship between financial market development and the importance of 
internal capital. Pang et al. (2009) explore the channel of capital allocation 
through which finance promotes economic growth and find that countries 
with developed financial markets invest more in growing industries, and 
pull out more funds of declining ones. Morck, Yavuz and Yeung (2011) 
observe less efficient capital allocation in countries whose banking systems 
are more thoroughly controlled by tycoons or big families. They find that 
countries with banking system controlled by tycoon or family have slower 
economic productivity growth, greater financial instability, and higher 
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degree of income inequality. Taboada (2011) studies the influence of the 
change in ownership structure of banks on the capital allocation efficiency, 
and shows that the decline in government ownership of banks affects 
capital allocation efficiency differently, depending on whether foreigners 
or large domestic holders who take over the stakes. In particular, the 
increase in domestic holder presence in the banking sector hampers capital 
allocation efficiency while the increased foreign presence in the banking 
sector leads to improvements in capital allocation.
Another factor which largely affects the allocation of capital is foreign 
direct investment. Capital of the developed countries usually seeks 
investment opportunities in other country according to the difference of 
resources endowment. This investment behavior changes the pattern of 
capital allocation of the invested country, leading to the increase of capital 
in the most efficient sectors. Despite numerous theories on this linkage, 
there is little empirical evidence on whether and how FDI improves the 
allocation of capital. Harrison et al. (2003) find that foreign enterprises 
have a spillover effect on domestic enterprises by attracting more bank 
loans due to their higher profitability and capital mobility. In developing 
countries, domestic enterprises face a harder credit constraint then the 
foreign enterprises, which may be released by FDI. However, there are 
a substantial number of studies suspect whether such spillovers do take 
place (Wang and Tu, 2007; Chen and Sheng, 2008). Wang (2006) shows 
that FDI has a technology spillover effect which can be enhanced by the 
improvements in the financial market efficiency such as lower financial 
costs and higher capability of labor. Aurangzeb and Stengos (2014) 
examine the relationship between FDI and economic growth with a smooth 
coefficient semi-parametric approach. Their results show that countries 
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with higher levels of FDI inflows have higher productivity, because FDI is 
not only an important direct determinant of growth, but also a tool helping 
improve factor productivity in the exports sector.
Financial development and FDI jointly affect the investment allocation 
efficiency. In other words, the mechanism of the interaction between 
financial development and FDI plays an important role in improving 
the efficiency of investment allocation. Yang and Lai (2006) propose a 
different view by showing that in China, the low efficiency of financial 
market obstructs domestic enterprises’ acquirement of foreign technology, 
although FDI has positive effects on accumulation of capital. Sun (2008) 
finds that financial development can contribute to the domestic capital 
accumulation and economic growth, encourage more FDI, provide better 
services to foreign enterprises, and transform the potential FDI spillover 
effect to real productivity. Lee and Chang (2009) claim that financial 
development indicators have a larger effect on economic growth than FDI, 
but in the long-run, FDI coupling with financial development contribute to 
global economic growth. Pang and Wu (2009) conclude that countries with 
developed financial market invest more in growing industries and withdraw 
funds from the industries with lower return, using international industrial 
data. Alfaro et al. (2010) find that development of the financial market 
benefits from FDI by economic growth promoted by the increase in FDI. 
The essential of the above literature is the indicator of investment 
allocation efficiency proposed by Wurgler (2000). This investment allocation 
efficiency indicator is obtained by regressing the investment growth rate of 
fixed assets and that of the industrial value-added, meaning that one unit 
of change in the growth rate of the industrial value-added leads to changes 
in the certain times of the investment growth rate of fixed assets. If the 
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ratio is positive, the investment will increase as the industrial value-added 
grows, in which case the investment is efficient; otherwise, the investment 
is inefficient. The commonly accepted method describes the relationship 
of capital return rate and investment allocation. Li et al. (2010) follow 
the original method and conclude that the average investment allocation 
efficiency indicator of China's various regions is 0.204, and the national 
overall efficiency indicator is only 0.126, which is far below the number 
(0.429) of average investment allocation efficiency of 65 countries calculated 
by Wurgler (2000). The question is: the large investment growth obviously 
could not be fully explained by the growth of the industrial value-added. 
The growth rate of China's fixed asset investment is between 11% - 20% in 
long-term, but the growth rate of China's industrial added value is always 
less than 7%, which means the growth rate of fixed asset investment is 
higher than industrial added value. Hence, Wurgler (2000) ’s investment 
allocation efficiency indicator does not match the current situation in 
China, and there should exist a more important factor affecting the fixed 
assets investment. The characteristic of investment is that capital flows to 
the industries or regions with high return, and the main representation of 
the return is the increase of sales volume and profit. Therefore, after the 
comparison, we consider it is suitable to calculate the investment allocation 
efficiency with industrial added value and industry sales. This paper 
contributes to the literature by setting two investment allocation efficiency 
indicators: sales elasticity of total fixed assets and industrial value added 
elasticity of total fixed assets. Then, we pay a closer examination on 
the relationships between financial development, FDI, and investment 
allocation efficiency in China. We aim at proposing a more proper 
assessment of the investment allocation efficiency and its determinants 
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based on China's economy, and providing more constructive suggestions on 
economic policies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses data and the 
measurement of some variables. Section 3 presents empirical analysis. 
In Section 4, we test the effect of financial structure on allocation of 
investment. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
 
2. Data and Measurement 
2.1 Manufacturing industry statistic 
The empirical investigation is based on manufacturing industry level 
panel data for 30 provinces of the Chinese mainland. The sources of the 
basic manufacturing industry statistics come from China Industry Economy 
Statistical Yearbook (2006-2012), which provides balance sheet information 
on 27 manufacturing industries. This paper needs balanced panel, so we 
require at least three consecutive years of observation on each industry. These 
criteria leave observation only available for 17 industries. Some provincial 
characteristics variables, including FDI measurement, information comes 
from China Statistical Yearbook (2007-2012). The proxies for financial 
development come from Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2007-2012).
Table 1 is the statistical description of industrial sales growth and 
growth in the industrial added value of 17 manufacturing industries in 
30 provincial areas of China Mainland. As shown in the table, both rates 
are lower in the relatively developed area such as Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Zhejiang, mainly due to the fact that their level of economic development 
was relatively high and the infrastructure construction was very complete 
at the beginning of this period. In particular, these areas had more rational 
second industry structure, stronger residents' consumption capacity, 
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smaller price elasticity of demand and income elasticity of demand, and 
more stable growth in the industry sales and industrial added value. 
Also, the tertiary industry had become the main economic composition in 
these areas; the second industry had lost its dominance; the demand for 
manufacturing product were reduced.
Table 1. Grouth rate of industrial sales and added value in provincial 
areas sales growth and investment growth
Province Industry sales growth Industrial value added growthMean. Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Beijing 0.132 0.161 102 0.106 0.230 102
Tianjin 0.239 0.258 102 0.190 0.313 102
Hebei 0.244 0.117 102 0.207 0.238 102
Shanxi 0.216 0.233 102 0.136 0.228 102
Inner Mongolia 0.383 0.266 102 0.239 0.323 102
Liaoning 0.284 0.162 102 0.174 0.241 102
Jilin 0.355 0.245 102 0.187 0.499 102
Heilongjiang 0.202 0.177 102 0.145 0.519 102
Shanghai 0.129 0.156 102 0.086 0.116 102
Jiangsu 0.232 0.120 102 0.188 0.188 102
Zhejiang 0.174 0.131 102 0.139 0.178 102
Anhui 0.358 0.179 102 0.311 0.527 102
Fujian 0.257 0.146 102 0.197 0.329 102
Jiangxi 0.363 0.184 102 0.267 0.367 102
Shandong 0.229 0.105 102 0.172 0.189 102
Henan 0.323 0.173 102 0.258 0.296 102
Hubei 0.320 0.149 102 0.235 0.345 102
Hunan 0.350 0.153 102 0.245 0.270 102
Guangdong 0.205 0.115 102 0.128 0.215 102
Guangxi 0.378 0.296 102 0.273 0.646 102
Hainan 1.266 4.961 102 1.093 3.470 102
Chongqing 0.301 0.177 102 0.186 0.250 102
Sichuan 0.329 0.172 102 0.276 0.444 102
Guizhou 0.209 0.208 102 0.184 0.473 102
Yunnan 0.249 0.243 102 0.215 0.537 102
Shaanxi 0.285 0.163 102 0.308 0.815 102
Gansu 0.228 0.222 102 0.126 0.610 102
Qinghai 0.549 1.514 102 0.606 5.080 102
Ningxia 0.306 0.583 102 0.272 0.494 102
Xinjiang 0.274 0.277 102 0.214 0.393 102
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2.2 Measuring the efficiency in the allocation of investment
Following the approach of Wurgler(2000), in this paper we use growth 
in total fixed assets to measure growth in investment, and measure the 
efficiency of capital allocation with two elasticity, industrial sales elasticity 
of total fixed assets and industrial value added1 elasticity of total fixed 
assets, both of which could be used as the form of  investment elasticity 
that “assumes that optimal investment implies increasing investment 
in industries that are growing and decreasing investment in industries 
that are declining”. The difference is that we estimate the elasticity of 
investment for each year in each province in China, comparing to the 
elasticity for each country in Wurgler (2000) or the elasticity of investment 
for each industry in each countries in Pang and Wu (2009).
  We estimate the following simple specification of industrial sales elasticity 
of total fixed assets for each province in each year:
 iptiptptptipt GSALESGINV εηα ++= (1)
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)1( −tipSALES  is industrial sales, i indexes manufacturing industry, p indexes 
province, and t indexes year. The slope estimate in Eq. (1) is an elasticity 
which measures the extent to which province p increases investment in its 
growing industries and decreases investment in its declining industries. If 
we use industrial value added instead of sales, then we get industrial value 
added elasticity of total fixed assets.
1　The industrial added value was itemized as a separate project before 2009, but it was 
no longer listed after 2009 separately. So the industrial value added is converted from 
several relevant variables according to the accounting standards.
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2.3 Specification of FDI  
Over the past decades, China has attracted a greater amount of FDI 
which contributes to the rapid economic growth. However, it is documented 
that the ratio of foreign direct investment in fixed assets to total investment 
decreases gradually in China, as a result of recent increase in fixed assets 
investment. We take manufacturing as an instance. The ratio of foreign 
direct investment in fixed assets to total investment was 23.79%2 in 2005, 
and the ratio fell to 7.24% in 2013. In this paper, we focus on four indicators 
of FDI: fdi1 is defined as the ratio of the gross industrial output value of 
joint ventures to this of industrial enterprises above designated size; fdi2 
is the ratio of industrial value added of joint ventures to this of industrial 
enterprises above designated size; fdi3 is the ratio of industry total assets 
of joint ventures to this of industrial enterprises above designated size; fdi4 
is the ratio of industry owners’ equity of joint ventures to this of industrial 
enterprises above designated size.
 
Figure 1. Total fixed asset investment and foreign direct investment 
on manufacturing
2   The data comes from China Statistical Yearbook (2006-2014)
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2.4 Financial development and other control variables
It is difficult to construct a single quantitative measure that captures 
the extent to which financial development in China fulfill its potential roles. 
The extent of financial development is best measured by the intermediaries’ 
ability to reduce information and transaction costs, mobilize savings, 
manage risks and facilitate transactions. Several measures of financial 
development have been proposed in the empirical literature. In our work, 
we focus on three indicators of financial intermediary development, 
each of which was constructed in such a way that an increase reflects 
greater financial depth. The three indicators are as follows, credit1, the 
proportion of domestic credit provided by banking sector to GDP; credit2, 
the proportion of domestic credit to private sector to GDP, representing 
the overall development in banking market, as commonly used in the 
empirical literature; stock, the ratio of total value of stocks traded to GDP, 
representing the measure of the size of equity markets.
However, investment allocation efficiency is important which is 
less likely to be fully ascribed to financial development and FDI. Most 
importantly, financial development and FDI could coincide with other 
economic factors that improve the efficiency in the allocation of investment 
prospects of industry. We relate the heterogeneity of the allocation of 
investment to several possibilities such as provincial characteristics 
variables since it is unlikely that their effects are the same in all cases. In 
this paper, we also employ six control variables: growth3  is defined as the 
growth rate of provincial real gross domestic product; consg is defined as 
the ratio of provincial government consumption to provincial gross domestic 
3　These indicators are all calculated at current price.
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product; indshare is defined as the ratio of provincial gross industry output 
value to provincial gross domestic product; wage is defined as natural 
logarithm of provincial average wage of staff and workers; inflation is 
measured by the log of annual price indices for investment in fixed assets 
by region; nshare is defined as the ratio of gross industry output value 
of state-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises to gross industry 
output value of industrial enterprises above designated size; ratio is defined 
as the proportion of domestic stock issuance to the increased amount of 
bank loan, which comes from Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 
(2012) as a measure of financial structure.
  Table 2 presents a summary analysis of the main variables used in 
this paper, as well as reports the average provincial elasticity estimates 
from Eq. (1) when we use industrial value added instead of industrial sales. 
The province elasticity estimates are denoted as ηˆVAD pt and  ηˆSALES pt , 
respectively.  
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics
　  Mean  Max  Min Std. Dev.
ηˆSALES pt 0.514 13.35 -18.08 1.978 
ηˆVAD pt 0.317  2.942 -19.26 1.608 
credit1 1.086 1.193 0.966 0.101 
credit2 0.226 0.288 0.177 0.050 
stock 0.314 0.481 0.116 0.152 
fdi1 0.210 0.658 0.016 0.174 
fdi2 0.204 0.652 0.003 0.165 
fdi3 0.189 0.569 0.018 0.148 
fdi4 0.181 0.492 0.054 0.072 
ratio 0.115 0.212 0.053 0.056
growth 0.184 0.323 0.006 0.054 
consg 0.148 0.297 0.082 0.418 
indshare 1.288 2.222 0.613 0.392 
wage 10.25 11.23 9.640 0.326 
inflation 4.642 4.730 4.564 0.036 
nshare 0.415 0.834 0.107 0.188 
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3. Empirical analysis
3.1 The empirical specification
Endogeneity problem should be concerned when we take empirical test 
of the impact of financial development and FDI on investment allocation 
efficiency, because the financial development and FDI could promote the 
investment allocation efficiency while investment allocation efficiency 
would also bring more FDI and capital inflow. To reduce the endogeneity 
effects on parameter estimation, we adopt dynamic panel data model which 
includes the lag explained variable as follow:
ηˆpt= β0  + ρηˆpt-1 + β1FDt +  β2FDt  * FDIpt +  β3FDIpt  + γ Xpt + δp+ εpt 
         (2)
where p represents the provinces; t represents the year; ηˆpt is the measure 
of industrial sales elasticity of total fixed assets or industrial value added 
elasticity of total fixed assets; ηˆp,t-1 is the lagged item of the ηˆpt ; FD is the 
measure of financial development which includes credit1, credit2, and 
stock; FDIpt  is the measure of FDI which includes fdi1, fdi2, fdi3, and fdi4; 
Xpt is a vector of provincial level control variables which contains growth, 
consg, indshare, wage, inflation, and nshare; δp is a time invariant province-
specific intercept that captures omitted fixed effect; and εpt is the error 
term. 
 
Eq. (2) contains the lagged dependent variable, which relates with 
the random disturbance term. If we use OLS to estimate the Eq. (2), it 
would yield biased and inconsistent estimates. Generally, dynamic panel 
data model with difference GMM (D-GMM) or system GMM (SYS -GMM) 
estimation method could solve the endogeneity problem validly. As a profit-
driven capital, bank credit does not only affect the investment allocation 
24
－25 （　）－
efficiency, but also is affected by the investment allocation efficiency, 
and the case of FDI is similar. In order to reduce the impact of this two-
way feedback mechanism, we choose to use the system GMM method to 
estimate the dynamic panel data model, which effectively reflects the 
dynamic characters of investment behavior, reduces the impact of the two-
way feedback mechanism on estimate results, and to a certain extent, 
obtains the consistent estimates.
3.2 The empirical results using industrial sales elasticity
 
Table 3 reports the average sales elasticity of total fixed assets estimates 
from Eq.(1) between 2007 to 2012 of all 30 provinces. Theoretically, the 
coefficient of elasticity should be a positive number which is slightly less 
than 1. From table 2 we can clearly observe that most of the provinces are 
in the normal state, indicating that the investment is relatively stable. But 
there exist some questions with Hainan and Fujian, for which the growth 
rate of fixed asset investment is more than double of growth rate of sales. 
The coefficient of Qinghai is also abnormal, but its fixed assets is reducing 
while the sales increasing, which suggesting that it is in normal situation. 
Most of the elasticity coefficients have good fits. 
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Table 3. Estimates of the sales elasticity of total fixed assets
Province ηˆSALESpt Rank
Hainan 2.606 1 
Fujian 1.955 2 
Guangxi 1.366 3 
Hebei 0.876 4 
Shannxi 0.710 5 
Chongqing 0.706 6 
Zhejiang 0.699 7 
Sichuan 0.688 8 
Yunnan 0.670 9 
Henan 0.669 10 
Shandong 0.644 11 
Guizhou 0.575 12 
Jiangsu 0.549 13 
Ningxia 0.530 14 
Shanxi 0.510 15 
Jiangxi 0.497 16 
Liaoning 0.445 17 
Hubei 0.432 18 
Inner Mongolia 0.429 19 
Jilin 0.428 20 
Shanghai 0.424 21 
Gansu 0.417 22 
Anhui 0.413 23 
Hunan 0.290 24 
Xinjiang 0.281 25 
Tianjin 0.272 26 
Beijing 0.180 27 
Guangdong 0.108 28 
Heilongjiang -0.066 29 
Qinghai -0.883 30 
Note: Estimates of the elasticity from Eq.(1)
We introduce the first-order lag consequent of explained variable in 
dynamic panel data model, setting financial development variables (credit1, 
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credit2, stock), FDI variables (fdi1, fdi2, fdi3, fdi4) and their interaction 
terms, area economic growth indicator growth as endogenous variable, 
with other control variables being exogenous variables. Estimation results 
of the dynamic panel data model with system generalized method of 
moments (SYS-GMM) are shown in Table 4. In SYS-GMM (1) - (4), fdi1, 
fdi2, fdi3, fdi4 are used as FDI variable, respectively. In panel A, the 
financial development indicator is credit1, while the indicators of financial 
development in panel B and panel C are credit2 and stock, respectively. 
The interaction between financial development and FDI is also examined.
Usually we could determine whether the GMM method is applicable 
through the test of autocorrelation of disturbance item in dynamic panel 
data model. The specific approach is to test the autocorrelation of the 
first-order and second-order difference of disturbance item under the null 
hypothesis “disturbance item does not exist correlation” in the original 
level equation, and then we could gain two statistics for AR(1) and AR(2). 
If AR(1) is significant while AR(2) is not, then it indicates that the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. At the same time, the Sargan statistic 
is used to test the validity of instrument variables in GMM estimation 
(Zhao, 2014). Estimation results in Table 4 show that, the AR(1)s of all the 
model are significant at 5% significant level, and AR(2)s are insignificant. 
Sargan statistics show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
instrumental variables are valid, indicating that the model is reasonable. 
We use robust standard errors when estimating the model, in order to 
ensure the validity of the parameter estimation results.
In column (1)-(4) of Panel A, we regress ηˆSALES pt on indicator of financial 
development indicator credit1, and fdi1, fdi2, fdi3, fdi4 respectively. 
The results display that financial development has positive effect on 
27
－28 （　）－
the investment allocation efficiency, for the coefficients of credit1 are all 
positive. However, we do find the coefficients of FDI are negative, meaning 
that too much FDI will bring negative impact on the long-term allocation 
of capital. After further analysis, we think that FDI has the crowding out 
effect to the domestic capital. The coefficients of interactive terms between 
financial development index and FDI are also negative which indicate that 
FDI can weaken the positive effect of financial development on investment 
allocation.
In column (1)-(4) of Panel B, we use credit2 (measured by domestic 
credit to private sector) as the indicator of financial development. The 
results are similar to those in Panel A. The four coefficients of credit2 
are all positive and insignificant, meaning that the bank credit flowing 
to private sector does not affect the investment allocation efficiency, and 
China's bank credit market could not effectively allocate resources for 
private economy. Coefficients of FDI are significantly negative, indicating 
that the increase of flow and stock of FDI both have a negative impact on 
the investment allocation efficiency in China. The coefficients of interactive 
terms between financial development and FDI are also negative, which 
show that the joint increase of FDI and domestic credit may further reduce 
the investment allocation efficiency. 
 In column (1)-(4) of Panel C, we use stock (measured by total value of 
stocks traded) as financial development indicator. The coefficients of stock 
are significantly negative when we regress dependent variable on fdi2, 
meaning that the ratio between the market value of stocks traded and GDP 
has negative effect on investment allocation efficiency. Coefficients of FDI 
are all negative but insignificant. However, the coefficients of interaction 
terms between financial development and FDI are significantly negative, 
28
－29 （　）－
which implies that there is a competition and crowding out effect between 
the stock market and FDI. In fact, both of them are capital searching for 
high return, and the competition between them is relatively fierce. 
Overall, all the coefficients of lagged dependent variables ηˆp,t-1 are 
insignificant, meaning that there is no continuity of investment allocation 
efficiency, i.e., the efficiency of the current period is not affected by the 
efficiency of previous year to a large extent. Most of the FDI coefficients are 
insignificant, we believe that the low ratio of FDI in total investment is one 
reason for this result.
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Table 4.  Effects of financial development and FDI on sales elasticity 
of total fixed assets
Panel A
                   SYS-GMM（1） SYS -GMM（2） SYS -GMM（3） SYS -GMM（4）
ηˆp,t-1 -0.016 -0.029 -0.009 -0.027
(-0.25) (-0.48) (-0.15) (-0.80)
credit1 5.389 5.131* 4.864 5.267***
(1.00) (1.84) (0.86) (2.97)
fdi*credit1 -7.519 -3.951 0.238 -5.368**
(-0.63) (-0.37) (0.02) (-2.22)
fdi -2.583 -0.387 24.46 -9.607**
(-0.12) (-0.02) (1.23) (-2.37)
growth 0.215** 0.242 0.0346 1.444**
(2.16) (1.08) (1.01) (2.42)
consg -19.89 -19.21 -19.35 -21.68**
(-0.98) (-0.95) (-1.17) (-2.06)
indshare 0.625 0.488 1.136 2.158
(0.36) (0.29) (0.48) (1.40)
wage -1.385** -0.995 -0.456 -1.421
(-2.24) (-0.62) (-0.35) (-1.05)
inflation -4.296 -4.278 -4.657 -4.101
(-0.36) (-0.36) (-0.41) (-0.35)
nshare 2.738 3.811 9.630 4.712**
(0.83) (0.63) (0.99) (2.43)
cons -7.871 -13.09 -28.98 -8.404
(-0.14) (-0.30) (-0.68) (-0.15)
AR(1) statistics
P Value
-2.432
0.015
-2.430
0.015
-2.428
0.015
-2.525
0.012
AR(2) statistics
P Value
3.695
0.952
3.228
0.820
3.404
0.839
3.701
0.915
Sargan statistics 
P Value
25.91
0.680
26.07
0.672
26.36
0.657
27.41
0.602
N 180 180 180 180
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Panel B
                   SYS-GMM（1） SYS -GMM（2） SYS -GMM（3） SYS -GMM（4）
ηˆp,t-1 -0.044 -0.006 -0.036 -0.015
(-0.94) (-0.29) (-0.83) (-0.39)
credit2 8.779 7.092 7.539 11.79
(1.17) (0.80) (0.78) (1.18)
fdi*credit2 -26.20** -15.01** -14.77 -29.82**
(-2.18) (-2.22) (-0.69) (-2.35)
fdi -6.686** -1.102 -26.04*** -10.70**
(-2.29) (-0.10) (-2.72) (-2.42)
growth 0.405** 0.640 0.347 0.937**
(2.15) (0.17) (0.09) (2.24)
consg -20.09 -19.97 -20.36** -21.81
(-0.95) (-0.96) (-2.19) (-1.04)
indshare 0.319 0.413 0.945 2.279
(0.19) (0.24) (0.41) (1.19)
wage -0.730 -0.283 0.295 -1.319
(-0.52) (-0.16) (0.18) (-0.83)
inflation -0.360 -0.706 -0.966 -0.245
(0.05) (-0.07) (-0.11) (0.03)
nshare 3.134 4.670 10.24 4.200
(0.99) (0.73) (1.05) (1.50)
cons 8.303 6.600 -6.419 12.08
(0.25) (0.23) (-0.24) (0.35)
AR(1) statistics
P Value
-2.515
0.013
-2.504
0.013
-2.510
0.013
-2.479
0.014
AR(2) statistics
P Value
4.021
0.983
3.665
0.948
3.942
0.967
3.505
0.917
Sargan statistics 
P Value
25.65
0.693
24.75
0.737
24.45
0.751
26.41
0.654
N 180 180 180 180
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Panel C
                   SYS-GMM（1） SYS -GMM（2） SYS -GMM（3） SYS -GMM（4）
ηˆp,t-1 -0.031 -0.019 -0.010 -0.026
(-0.25) (-0.48) (-0.15) (-0.80)
stock -1.542 -2.598** -3.505 1.394
(-0.43) (-2.16) (-0.99) (0.86)
fdi*stock -0.662 4.252 2.758 -16.58**
(-0.06) (0.70) (0.24) (-2.30)
fdi -8.602 -6.522 26.35 -10.27
(-0.35) (-0.69) (1.74) (-0.41)
growth 1.525*** 0.930 2.406 2.840**
(2.58) (0.37) (0.75) (2.11)
consg -21.43 -20.25 -20.59** -21.41
(-0.95) (-0.92) (-2.15) (-0.98)
indshare 0.832 0.435 1.179 1.869
(0.46) (0.24) (0.49) (0.98)
wage 0.576 1.048 2.515** 0.498
(0.29) (1.06) (2.46) (0.25)
inflation -6.416 -6.928 -11.34** -6.577
(-1.12) (-0.88) (-2.17) (-1.09)
nshare 3.517 3.495 11.16 4.137
(1.03) (0.49) (1.08) (1.63)
cons 27.08 24.61 19.79 27.14
(0.87) (0.80) (0.68) (0.84)
AR(1) statistics
P Value
-2.463
0.014
-2.426
0.015
-2.454
0.014
-2.562
0.012
AR(2) statistics
P Value
3.165
0.869
2.301
0.763
2.471
0.786
3.477
0.920
Sargan 
P Value
25.28
0.712
21.12
0.884
26.09
0.671
18.60
0.948
N 180 180 180 180
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Of the six additional variables, the coefficients of growth, the growth 
rate of provincial real gross domestic product are positive, suggesting 
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that increases in GDP can lead to growth in long term investment. The 
coefficients of inflation, the log of annual price indices for investment 
in fixed assets by region, are negative, indicating that the rapid rise of 
cost would bring down the investment in fixed assets. The coefficients 
of wage, the provincial average wage of staff and workers, are different 
within different situation. In panel A, the coefficients are all negative, 
but they are all positive in panel C. The coefficients of consg, the ratio of 
provincial government consumption to provincial gross domestic product, 
are always negative but most of them are insignificant. The coefficients 
of indshare, the proportion of the ratio of provincial gross industry output 
value to provincial gross domestic product, are always insignificantly 
positive. The coefficients of nshare, the ratio of gross industry output value 
of state-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises to gross industry 
output value of industrial enterprises above designated size, are always 
insignificantly positive. Wurgler (2000) claims that the efficiency of capital 
allocation is negatively correlated with the extent of state ownership in the 
economy, which is not supported by our findings. 
3.3 The empirical results using industrial velus added elasticity
Wurgler (2000) argues that growth in value added reflects investment 
opportunities. In this part, we use industrial value added instead of 
industry sales to estimate the elasticity of industry investment from Eq.(1). 
Table 5 reports the average industrial value-added elasticity of total fixed 
assets in 30 regions. According to the above, the coefficient of elasticity 
should be a positive number. From Table 5, we can find that most of the 
industrial value added elasticity of total fixed assets are range from 0.3-
0.8, which is a normal range. The coefficients of elasticity are negative in 
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Hainan and Fujian, meaning that the investment allocation efficiency of 
these two provinces is low and should be optimized timely.
 
Table 5. Estimates of the industrial value added elasticity of total fixed 
assets
Province ηˆVADpt Rank
Jilin 0.704 1
Jiangxi 0.664 2
Chongqing 0.651 3
Shannxi 0.620 4
Hebei 0.603 5
Shanghai 0.578 6
Guangxi 0.576 7
Ningxia 0.573 8
Shandong 0.573 9
Sichuan 0.555 10
Henan 0.545 11
Jiangsu 0.531 12
Shanxi 0.515 13
Yunnan 0.507 14
Qinghai 0.497 15
Beijing 0.482 16
Hubei 0.464 17
Tianjin 0.387 18
Inner Mongolia 0.386 19
Anhui 0.371 20
Hunan 0.364 21
Guangdong 0.316 22
Guizhou 0.310 23
Heilongjiang 0.299 24
Liaoning 0.294 25
Gansu 0.238 26
Zhejiang 0.149 27
Xinjiang 0.098 28
Fujian -0.414 29
Hainan -2.926 30
Note: Estimates of the elasticity are obtained from Eq.(1)
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We now provide the econometric evidence on the effect of financial 
development and FDI on the industrial value added elasticity of total fixed 
assets, ηˆVAD pt . Similarly to section 3.2, here we take credit1, credit2, and 
stock as indicators of financial development. The regression results are 
reported in Table 6. 
In column (1)-(4) of Panel A, we regress ηˆVAD pt  on indicator of financial 
development, credit1, and fdi1, fdi2, fdi3, fdi4, respectively. These results 
are different from the above results significantly. All of the coefficients 
of credit1 are negative, and results in column (1) and (4) are statistically 
significant at the 5% level, indicating a negative relationship between 
credit loan and investment efficiency. The coefficients of FDI in column (1) 
is significantly positive, suggesting that higher ratio of FDI market share 
contributes to investment in fixed assets. In column (1), the coefficient of 
interactive terms between financial development index credit1 and FDI is 
positive. The threshold value of FDI is 0.279, and the mean value is 0.21 (as 
shown in Table 2), suggesting that FDI was below the minimum threshold 
value to fully promote the marginal effects of domestic bank loan. 
In column (1) and (4) of Panel B, two coefficients of credit2 are 
significantly negative. In column (1), the coefficient of credit2 is -8.110; the 
coefficient of interactive terms between financial development index credit2 
and FDI is 41.92. Hence, the threshold value of FDI is 0.193, smaller than 
the mean value 0.21, indicating that FDI reached the minimum threshold 
value to fully promote the marginal effects of domestic loans to the private 
sector.  
Unlike results in Table 4, column (1)-(4) of Panel C in Table 6 show 
significantly positive coefficients of stock, suggesting positive effects of 
stock on investment allocation. In column (1) and (2), coefficients of FDI are 
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significantly positive, indicating that increases in FDI ratio can improve 
the efficiency of fixed assets investment. In column (4), the coefficient of 
interactive terms between stock and FDI is significantly positive, showing 
that stock market activities along with FDI encourage investment in fixed 
assets.
The coefficients of interaction terms between financial development 
index and FDI show that there is no competition and crowding out effect 
between financial development and FDI when we take industrial value-
added elasticity of total fixed assets to indicate the investment allocation 
efficiency.
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Table 6. Effects of financial development and FDI on industrial 
value added elasticity of total fixed assets 
Panel A
                   SYS-GMM（1） SYS -GMM（2） SYS -GMM（3） SYS -GMM（4）
ηˆp,t-1 -0.058 -0.047 -0.034 -0.049
(-0.31) (-0.27) (-0.14) (-0.19)
credit1 -4.071** -2.368 -3.379 -3.217**
(-2.29) (-1.17) (-1.29) (-2.25)
fdi*credit1 14.57** -2.474 2.566 7.960
(2.31) (-0.35) (0.28) (1.18)
fdi 22.59** 19.22 -7.659 35.94
(2.42) (0.23) (-0.68) (1.02)
growth -1.231 0.513 -0.997 -2.937
(-0.45) (0.21) (-0.43) (-1.05)
consg 3.185 0.521 5.918 6.020
(0.29) (0.05) (0.62) (0.57)
indshare -1.827 -1.185 -3.257 -4.200
(-1.35) (-0.84) (-1.16) (-1.74)
wage 3.359*** 1.961** 1.681** 3.456**
(2.96) (2.51) (2.69) (2.64)
inflation 1.462 1.128 1.909 1.635
(0.25) (0.15) (0.31) (0.31)
nshare -2.114 -5.568 -14.02 -4.877**
(-0.75) (-0.80) (-1.03) (-2.28)
cons -41.55 -22.16 -11.87 -41.24
(-1.21) (-0.75) (-0.69) (-1.25)
AR(1) statistics -4.563 -4.783 -4.428 -5.101
P Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) statistics 4.009 3.757 3.821 3.976
P Value 0.951 0.833 0.857 0.933
Sargan statistics 31.44 30.60 31.91 32.67
P Value 0.186 0.194 0.181 0.179
N 180 180 180 180
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Panel B
                   SYS-GMM（1） SYS -GMM（2） SYS -GMM（3） SYS -GMM（4）
ηˆp,t-1 -0.083 -0.036 -0.055 -0.089
(-0.41) (-0.25) (-0.17) (-0.17)
credit2 -8.110** -2.134 -6.407 -10.48**
(-2.26) (-0.44) (-0.94) (-2.22)
fdi*credit2 41.92** 2.888 21.13 39.43
(2.27) (0.27) (0.76) (1.84)
fdi 30.69 15.50 -7.737 36.82
(1.44) (1.01) (-1.00) (1.04)
growth -0.630 0.349 -0.668 -2.485
(-0.23) (0.12) (-0.27) (-0.84)
consg 2.947 1.267 6.617 5.483
(0.26) (0.12) (0.68) (0.51)
indshare -1.500 -1.178 -3.077 -4.220
(-1.28) (-0.82) (-1.19) (-1.76)
wage 2.819*** 1.242 1.134 3.618**
(2.56) (0.92) (1.13) (2.29)
inflation 2.234 5.274 5.157 2.608
(0.53) (0.61) (0.81) (0.61)
nshare -2.646 -6.548 -14.59** -3.890
(-0.95) (-0.86) (-2.27) (-1.16)
cons -42.82 -35.73 -24.07 -49.18
(-1.73) (-1.28) (-1.57) (-1.77)
AR(1) statistics -4.717 -5.012 -4.790 -5.434
P Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) statistics 4.013 3.568 3.786 3.946
P Value 0.952 0.820 0.839 0.915
Sargan statistics 30.62 31.90 31.21 31.92
P Value 0.193 0.182 0.187 0.181
N 180 180 180 180
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Panel C
                   SYS-GMM（1） SYS -GMM（2） SYS -GMM（3） SYS -GMM（4）
ηˆp,t-1 -0.081 -0.050 -0.061 -0.099
(-0.21) (-0.13) (-0.34) (-0.51)
stock 0.253 3.066 2.679** 0.489
(0.15) (1.68) (2.42) (0.38)
fdi*stock 9.171 -1.850 5.474 9.890**
(0.95) (-0.47) (0.47) (2.37)
fdi 33.03** 16.34** -8.614 3.75
(2.43) (2.49) (-1.24) (1.38)
growth -2.769 -1.557 -3.842 -3.163
(-1.02) (-0.51) (-1.13) (-1.15)
consg 3.998 1.574 6.824 4.346
(0.35) (0.14) (0.68) (0.39)
indshare -2.044 -1.285 -3.251 -2.921
(-1.26) (-0.82) (-1.13) (-1.29)
wage 2.011 -0.175 -1.005 2.096
(1.60) (-0.16) (-0.80) (1.54)
inflation 8.993* 12.98 16.63* 9.305*
(2.00) (1.20) (2.49) (2.02)
nshare -3.097 -6.809 -15.75* -2.808
(-0.90) (-0.88) (-2.29) (-0.85)
cons -65.82** -57.78 -55.70 -67.53**
(-2.11) (-1.51) (-1.80) (-2.10)
AR(1) statistics -5.023 -5.167 -4.890 -5.876
P Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) statistics 3.657 3.951 3.814 4.091
P Value 0.814 0.877 0.852 0.941
Sargan statistics 30.78 32.24 31.94 31.47
P Value 0.191 0.173 0.180 0.185
N 180 180 180 180
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Among the control variable, the coefficients of wage are significantly 
positive in Panel A as well as in column (1) and (4) of Panel B, suggesting 
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that increases in wage lead fixed investment to industries with higher 
growth rates. In Table 6, coefficients of nshare are significantly negative, 
confirming with the findings of Wurgler (2005) in the sense that the large 
state-owned share in Chinese economy prevents capital to be allocated 
to industries with a rapid growth. The coefficients of other variables 
such as growth and inflation are insignificant, suggesting mild effects on 
investment allocation that aims at increasing industrial added value. 
4. The effect of financial structure on allocation of investment
Besides studying the effects of FDI and financial development on 
efficiency of investment allocation, we investigate how financial structure 
affects investment efficiency. Previous debate on financial structure are 
mainly conducted from four aspects: bank, market, financial services, and 
law. The bank-based view highlights the positive role of banks that banks 
are more effective in providing external resources to investment activities 
(Allen & Gale, 2004). The market-based view stresses both the positive 
role of markets and the comparative advantages of markets over banks 
in effectively allocating capital. They emphasize that powerful banks 
frequently stymie innovation by extracting informational rents and banks 
have an inherent bias toward conservative investments (Morck et al., 1999; 
La Porta et al., 2002; Stiglitz, 1985). The financial services view argues that 
the bank-based versus market-based debate is not important. It is financial 
services themselves that are by far more important, than the form of their 
delivery (Luintel et al., 2008). The law and finance view emphasizes the role 
of the legal system which protects outside investors by enforcing contracts 
effectively and boosts financial development and thereby facilitates external 
financing and efficient capital allocation (La Porta et al,2000).
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In this part, we use ratio as the measure of financial structure, the 
variable is defined as the proportion of domestic stock issuance to the increased 
amount of bank loan, to examine its impact on the efficiency of capital 
allocation. The econometric evidence on the effect of financial structure on 
the elasticity estimates of industry investment to industry sales, ηˆSALES pt , are 
reported in Table 7. In column (1)-(4), we regress ηˆSALES pt on indicators of fdi1, 
fdi2, fdi3, fdi4, respectively, and on indicators of financial development 
credit1, stock with their interactive terms with FDI, as well as other control 
variables. The coefficients of ratio are significantly positive which implies 
that the ratio of domestic raised capital in stock market to amount of 
loan of bank promotes the effect in investment allocation as it increases. 
It seems that our results are in favor of market-based view. Although 
substantial proportions of the shares of many listed firms are owned by 
the state and they cannot be traded freely in Chinese stock market, as the 
proportion of private economy to the overall economy gradually rise, the 
function of capital allocation of stock market will be strengthened. 
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Table 7. The effect of financial structure on allocation of investment 
                   SYS-GMM（1） SYS -GMM（2） SYS -GMM（3） SYS -GMM（4）
ηˆp,t-1 -0.051 -0.066 -0.056 0.021
(-0.15) (-0.38) (-0.13) (0.35)
ratio 2.668*** 3.247 2.228*** 1.363
(2.77) (1.08) (2.79) (0.51)
credit1 1.969** 1.579 0.721 2.420
(2.25) (0.61) (0.63) (0.25)
fdi*credit1 8.407 -0.467 -8.153 2.722
(1.20) (-0.06) (-0.83) (0.26)
fdi*stock 5.860 -0.923 9.627 -12.54
(0.74) (-0.20) (0.62) (-0.26)
stock -0.120 1.530 0.938 4.983
(-0.05) (0.87) (0.50) (1.43)
fdi -25.82 -16.65** -1.708 5.886
(-1.30) (-2.18) (-0.28) (0.53)
growth -4.087 -2.862 -4.498 -4.891**
(-1.18) (-0.76) (-1.09) (-2.22)
consg 3.175 0.507 5.794 8.760
(0.28) (0.05) (0.59) (0.87)
inshare -2.038** -1.448 -3.427 -4.605
(2.46) (-0.92) (-1.14) (-1.22)
wage -2.509 0.980 0.218 0.056
(-1.03) (0.81) (0.21) (0.04)
inflation 6.607 7.526 10.81** 12.25
(0.94) (0.66) (2.37) (1.06)
nsahre -3.675 -7.022 -15.47 -17.06
(-1.04) (-0.89) (-1.09) (-1.14)
cons -57.49 -41.82 -39.65 -44.46
(-1.49) (-1.01) (-1.34) (-1.36)
AR(1) statistics -4.313 -4.256 -5.015 -5.317
P Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) statistics 3.987 3.972 3.990 4.210
P Value 0.923 0.911 0.924 0.957
Sargan statistics 19.57 21.48 19.59 21.87
P Value 0.932 0.872 0.931 0.865
N 180 180 180 180
t statistics in parentheses  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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5. Conclusions
China's proportion of fixed investment in GDP is much higher than 
those in the developed countries, which makes the conventional indicator of 
investment allocation efficiency less applicable for Chinese economic data. 
After comparing various economic indicators, we consider using industrial 
sales to calculate the investment allocation efficiency to effectively describe 
the current status of investment. Therefore, using China’s provincial panel 
data set containing 17 industries from 2006 to 2012, we set two investment 
allocation efficiency indicators, the industrial sales elasticity of total 
fixed assets and the industrial value-added elasticity of total fixed assets, 
respectively, and then assess the effect of financial development and foreign 
direct investment on the two indicators. When using the industrial sales 
elasticity of total fixed assets to indicate investment allocation efficiency, 
we find that the total bank credit improves the investment allocation 
efficiency significantly, while the bank credit to the private sector only 
influences the investment allocation efficiency mildly. Unlike most of 
existing literature, we claim that FDI and stock market play opposite roles 
in promoting investment. There exist great competition and crowding out 
between bank credit, private sector bank credit, stock market scale and 
FDI; despite the crowding out effect, bank credit improves the investment 
allocation efficiency significantly. As the substitution effect of China's 
securities market on bank credit gradually gets stronger, investment 
allocation efficiency has been improved to a larger extent. Contradictory 
results are obtained by using industrial value-added elasticity of total 
fixed assets as the efficiency indicator. In particular, total domestic bank 
credit and bank credit to the private sector both have negative effect on 
the investment allocation efficiency, but FDI could promote the investment 
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allocation efficiency to a certain extent. Furthermore, FDI is below the 
minimum threshold value to make the total domestic bank loan have a 
positive marginal effect, but it reaches the minimum threshold value to 
make domestic loans to the private sector have a positive marginal effect. 
Stock market also has a positive effect on investment allocation efficiency. 
Anyways, there is no competition and crowding out effect between financial 
development and FDI, when we take industrial value-added elasticity 
of total fixed assets to indicate the investment allocation efficiency. The 
effect of all the other control variables on investment allocation also root in 
distinguishing between the two elasticities. 
In sum, China's economy is mainly spurred by investment, and 
investment has a very obvious sales-driven phenomenon. We find that 
significant differences exist between the two investment allocation 
efficiency indicators calculated by industrial sales and industrial added 
value, and so are their influence factors and path. Therefore, policy 
makers should make investment decisions based on the economic status, 
development plan and, select the optimum investment scheme, and then 
transform the sales-driven investment into industrial added value driven 
investment gradually, in order to achieve benefit maximization.
References
Allen, F. and D. Gale, 2004, Financial intermediaries and markets, Econometrica, 72, 
pp.1023-1061.
Alfaro, L., A. Chanda and S. Kalemli-Ozcan, 2004, FDI and economic growth: the role of 
local financial markets, Journal of International Economics, 64, pp.89–112.
Alfaro, L., A. Chanda, S. Kalemli-Ozcan and S. Sayek, 2010, Does foreign direct 
investment promote growth? Exploring the role of financial markets on linkages, 
Journal of Development Economics, 91, pp.242-256.
Aurangzeb, Z and Stengos, T, 2014, The role of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in a 
dualistic growth framework: A smooth coefficient semi-parametric approach, Borsa 
44
－45 （　）－
Istanbul Review, 14, pp.133–144.
Beck, T and Levine, R, 2002, Industry growth and capital allocation: does having a market- 
or bank-based system matter? Journal of Financial Economics, 64,pp 147-180.
Calderon, C. and L. Liu, 2003, The direction of causality between financial development 
and economic growth, Journal of Development Economics, 72, pp.321– 334.
Chen, J. and Y. Sheng, 2008, An empirical study on FDI international knowledge 
spillovers and regional economic development in China, Economic Research Journal, 43, 
pp.39–49.
Christopoulos, D. K. and E. G. Tsionas, 2004, Financial development and economic 
growth: evidence from panel unit root and cointegration tests, Journal of Development 
Economics, 73, pp.55– 74.
Galindo, A., F. Schiantarelli and A. Weiss, 2007, Does financial liberalization improve 
the allocation of investment? Micro-evidence from developing countries, Journal of 
Development Economics, 83, pp.562–587.
Harrison, A. E. and M. S. McMillan, 2003, Does direct foreign investment affect domestic 
credit constraints?, Journal of International Economics, 61, pp.73–100.
Islam, S. S. and A. Mozumdar, 2006, Financial market development and the importance 
of internal cash: Evidence from international data, Journal of Banking & Finance, 31, 
pp.641–658.
Lee, C. and Chang. C. 2009, FDI, financial development, and economic growth: 
international evidence, Journal of Applied Economics, 12, pp.249–271.
Li.Q.,Q.Zhao, J.Li,c.Jiang, 2010, Foreign direct investment, financial development and 
regional capital allocation efficiency-Evidence from provincial industry data, Journal of 
financial research, No3, pp80-97.
Liu, S., 2008, International trade, FDI and declines in China’s TFP, Journal of 
Quantitative & Technical Economics, 25, pp.28–39.
Luintel, K. B., M. Khan, P. Arestis, and K. Theodoridis, 2008, Financial structure and 
economic growth, Journal of Development Economics, 86, pp.181–200.
Morck, R. and M. Nakamura, 1999. Banks and corporate control in Japan. Journal of 
Finance 54, 319–340.
Morck,R , Yavuz,D and Yeung,B, 2011, Banking system control, capital allocation, and 
economy performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 100,pp 264–283.
Ndikumana, L., 2005, Financial development, financial structure, and domestic 
investment: International evidence, Journal of International Money and Finance, 24, 
pp.651-673.
Pang, J. and H. Wu, 2009, Financial markets, financial dependence, and the allocation of 
capital, Journal of Banking & Finance, 33, pp.810–818.
Rioja, F. and N. Valev, 2004, Does one size fit all? A reexamination of the finance and 
growth relationship, Journal of Development Economics, 74, pp.429– 447.
Stiglitz, J.E., 1985. Credit markets and the control of capital. Journal of Money Credit and 
45
－46 （　）－
Banking 17, 133–152.
Sun, L., 2008, Financial development, FDI and economic growth, Journal of Quantitative 
&Technical Economics, 25, pp.3-14.
Taboada, A.G., 2011, The impact of changes in bank ownership structure on the allocation 
of capital: International evidence, Journal of Banking & Finance, 35, 2528–2543
Wang, L. and T. Qin, 2007, An Analysis on the Conditions of FDI Productivity Spillovers 
in Chinese Manufacturing Sector, China Economic Quarterly, 6, pp.171-184.
Wang, L. Wu and Y. Yang, 2009, Does the stock market affect firm investment in China? A 
price informativeness perspective, Journal of Banking & Finance, 33,pp. 53–62.
Wang, Y. FDI spillovers,2006, financial market and economic growth, Journal of 
Quantitative & Technical Economics, 23 , pp.59–68.
Wurgler, J., 2000, Financial markets and the allocation of capital, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 58, pp.187-214.
Xie, J., 2006, Technical spillovers if foreign direct investment in China, China Economic 
Quarterly, 5 , pp.1109–1128.
Yang, X. and Y. Lai, 2006, FDI and technology spillovers, Journal of Quantitative & 
Technical Economics, 23 , pp.72–81.
Yao, S., G. Feng, and K. Wei, 2006, Economic growth in the presence of FDI, Economic 
Research Journal, 41, pp.35–46.
Zhao, Q. and C. Zhang, 2006, Technology spillover effects of FDI and economy growth, 
Journal of Quantitative & Technical Economics, 23, pp.111–120.
Zhao, G., 2014, Advanced Econometrics: Methods and Applications, Renmin University of 
China Press.
提出年月日：2016 年 5 月 16 日
46
